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THE IMPORTANCE OF LITIGANT WEALTH
Albert Yoon*
INTRODUCTION
In litigation, there are three relevant actors: the plaintiff, the defen-
dant, and the court. Each has different incentives. The litigants have
opposing incentives: each side wants as favorable an outcome as possi-
ble, even at the expense of the other side. The court's incentive, how-
ever, is entirely different. It wants to reach the correct outcome based
on the information presented before it. In most instances, the court
reaches an outcome that corresponds to the preferences of one of the
litigants, although in some instances, the court may reach a decision
that displeases both litigants.
It is important to recognize that in an adversarial system such as
ours, the court's role is constrained. In each case, the court makes a
decision based on the information presented by the litigants' lawyers.
The court must play a neutral and, in this regard, largely passive role
in the information process. While the court makes determinations on
the admissibility of evidence, its role is not to raise arguments over-
looked by the litigants, nor is it to balance deficiencies in legal repre-
sentation of one or both of the parties. Therefore, the decision of the
court is based solely on the information that the litigants presented.
The adversarial system is a study of persuasion amid divergent in-
centives. The litigants attempt to convince the court of their view of
the case, in most cases, through the mechanism of lawyers. Accord-
ingly, lawyers are both the controlling and limiting factor because the
court decides a case based on the facts and laws presented by the law-
yers. Consequently, the quality of any decision-however impartial
the court-depends on the facts and law upon which it is based. Al-
though the court will reach an autonomous decision, the information
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provided by the lawyers will influence the decision that the court
reaches.
An important implication of the adversarial system is that the law-
yers, acting on behalf of their clients, jointly affect case outcomes.
The effectiveness of a lawyer cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather
only in conjunction with the relative effectiveness of her opposing
counsel. If there are considerable differences in skill between oppos-
ing lawyers, it could affect the outcome of the case.1 For example, it
may affect the magnitude of the remedy (e.g., the scope of damages),
or which party prevails (e.g., whether the plaintiff is awarded damages
at all).
Multiple disciplines within law have made valuable contributions to
our understanding of litigation. One such contribution has come from
law and society scholars. A seminal contribution came from Marc Ga-
lanter, twenty-five years ago, when he famously observed that litiga-
tion favors the "haves" over the "have-nots. ' '2 He commented that
the haves, typically wealthy litigants, are often repeat participants who
understand the nuances of litigation; the have-nots are less wealthy
litigants, often "one-shotters" who are much less sophisticated.3 In
litigation that pairs the haves against the have-nots, the former are
more likely to prevail. Galanter's work inspired subsequent explora-
tion of litigation involving parties of disparate wealth, both in the
United States 4 and other countries. 5
1. For an excellent discussion of the effect of the incentives of litigants regarding legal ex-
penses, see generally Avery W. Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988).
2. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 103-04 (1974); see generally IN LITIGATION DO THE "HAVES"
STILL COME OuT AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003) (providing a series of
statistical and case studies testing Galanter's claims); Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflec-
tions on Galanter's "Haves" Article and Work It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & Soc'v REV. 1099 (1999)
(describing Galanter's influence on subsequent scholarship).
3. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 97.
4. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR (2005); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Ad-
vanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474 (1985); Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profes-
sion: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 LAW & POL'Y Q. 5 (1979);
Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Su-
preme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 403 (1987).
5. See generally David M. Engel, Landscapes of the Law: Injury, Remedy, and Social Change
in Thailand, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 61 (2009); Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell & Randi
Ryterman, Do Repeat Players Behave Differently in Russia? Contractual and Litigation Behavior
of Russian Enterprises, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 833 (1999); Peer Zumbansen, Law'After the Wel-
fare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 Am. J. COMP.
LAW. 769 (2008).
650 [Vol. 59:649
2010] THE IMPORTANCE OF LITIGANT WEALTH 651
Another contribution to our understanding of litigation has come
from law and economics scholars. In the aftermath of scholarship on
settlement,6 Steven Shavell wrote a seminal article with the short title,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial, in which he described the conditions under
which a plaintiff brings suit, and thereafter, the conditions under
which the parties either settle or proceed to trial.7 At each of these
stages, each party engages in a cost-benefit analysis.8 Shavell provides
a model to explain how parties maximize the returns of litigation: they
proceed in litigation only when doing so yields higher expected net
returns than if they were to settle.9 Shavell's paper inspired subse-
quent scholarship that explored various conditions under which par-
ties resolve disputes. 10
I focus on these disciplines because they have arguably made the
greatest contributions to our understanding of litigation. I also posit
that because of their different emphases, they have not fully explored
the role of legal representation in litigation. In their dichotomy be-
tween the haves and the have-nots, law and society scholars recognize
how law favors the wealthy and disfavors the poor. Wealth, however,
is ultimately a continuum, where litigant wealth runs the entire gamut.
While differences in wealth may matter most when a wealthy litigant
is pitted against a poor litigant, it potentially matters even when the
differences are less stark.
Conversely, while law and economics scholars have made important
theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of litiga-
tion, they have largely ignored the costs of legal representation.
These costs are included in these models, but they are typically exoge-
nously assigned to the parties rather than decided by the parties.
6. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 279 (1973); Wil-
liam Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61 (1971).
7. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56 (1982). Shavell's article
motivated a new line of scholarship in law and economics to explain how parties negotiate dur-
ing litigation. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404-15 (1984); I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settle-
ment, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settle-
ment, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986): Kathryn E.
Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STuD. 93 (1992). For an excellent
review of the scholarship on this topic, see generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Rein-
ganum, Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 35 (2005).
8. See Shavell, supra note 7, at 56-57.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 7; Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, Settlement
Negotiations with Two Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution,
and Efficiency, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 283 (1994); P'ng, supra note 7; Reinganum, supra note
7; Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 84 (1994).
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More significantly, the models assume that parties have the resources
to pay these costs, an assumption that is at odds with what we know
about actual litigation.'"
This Article seeks to explore the relationship between litigant
wealth, the costs of litigation, and litigation outcomes. Lawyers are
the focal point by which parties litigate and resolve disputes. To bet-
ter understand litigation, one needs to recognize how the absolute and
relative financial resources of litigants influence their decisions. In
short, I argue that litigant wealth has a significant effect on legal out-
comes, in both subtle and dramatic ways.
This basic argument consists of three parts. First, the more financial
resources available to a party in litigation, the more she can spend on
legal representation. The cost of legal representation is not trivial,1 2
and it places a greater financial burden on parties with less wealth.
Second, the more a party expends on legal representation, the greater
her chances, all things being equal, of a favorable legal outcome. The
idea is that by spending more on legal representation, a party gets
more in return: more time spent on gathering facts, better preparation
of witnesses, and more thorough development of arguments. The
third statement logically follows from the first two: the more financial
resources available to a party in litigation, the greater her chances, all
things being equal, of a favorable legal outcome.
First, in Part II of this Article, I describe heterogeneity in the qual-
ity of legal representation by drawing upon recent empirical studies. 13
Next, in Part III, I discuss the heterogeneity in the wealth of litigants,
both in the general population and between opposing parties.' 4 In
Parts IV and V, I describe how the interplay of heterogeneous lawyer
quality and litigant wealth affects outcomes at every stage of litiga-
tion.' 5 I briefly describe existing mechanisms to mitigate the hetero-
geneity in litigant wealth and their limits in Part VI.16 Finally, in Part
VII, I conclude by suggesting areas for future research and policy by
exploring various considerations. 17
11. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 2.
12. Attorneys typically do not publicize their fees, but federal courts rely on the Laffey Ma-
trix, which constructs hourly fees based on attorney experience, when assessing the appropriate
amount of attorneys' fees. In 2009, a lawyer with one to three years of experience had an hourly
fee of $275. See U.S. Attorney's Office for the Dist. of Columbia, Laffey Matrix 2003-2009,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dcDivisions/CivilDivision/Laffey-Matrix_7.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2009).
13. See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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I. EVALUATING LEGAL REPRESENTATION
One of the core ideals in American society is that we live according
to the rule of law.18 When disputes arise, parties resolve them without
the use of force, guided by existing laws. When parties are unable to
reach a resolution on their own, they can turn to an impartial court
that is charged with rendering a fair and reasonable decision. We
pride ourselves on the belief that our legal system is coherent and
consistent and that litigants receive equal treatment under the law.19
The role of the lawyer is central to this enterprise, as articulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law.... He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a per-
fect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.20
The demands placed on the lawyer are substantial. She is entrusted
with two important tasks: (1) to possess a substantive and procedural21
understanding of the law relevant to her client, and (2) to ably apply
this knowledge to the relevant facts of the case in a manner that is
most helpful to the client. These responsibilities are a challenging un-
dertaking for lawyers, and a potentially insurmountable challenge for
non-lawyers. As Robert Rasmussen has commented, "Nonlawyers
know that law is not their domain. ' 22
Legal representation encompasses multiple components, including
the gathering of facts and the development of arguments. While the
production of legal representation often involves several people-
such as litigants and witnesses-the lawyer serves as the focal point,
responsible for overseeing and directing the case in a manner that is
18. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) ("Like the character
of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the
character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law.").
19. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (rejecting the rationale for a discrimina-
tory law enforcement method and holding that "this argument flouts the basic principle that all
people must stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court").
20. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
21. The procedural rules that govern civil and criminal law are equally complex, drawing calls
for simplification from legal scholars. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION 395 (1906). For a recent criticism of the complexity of procedural
rules, see Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 565 (2006)
(discussing the continuing applicability of Pound's critiques of modern litigation).
22. Robert K. Rasmussen, Lawyers, Law, and Contract Formation, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2748,
2752 (2000) (describing what lawyers contribute to clients in the realm of transactional law).
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most beneficial to her client. Accordingly, when discussing legal rep-
resentation, this Article focuses on the lawyer.
The argument that the resources of the parties influence legal out-
comes rests on two important premises. The first is that the quality of
legal representation is heterogeneous, or stated more simply, that
some lawyers are more effective than others. If Law School Admis-
sion Test (LSAT) scores are a proxy for lawyer quality, as illustrated
by Figure 1, the distribution appears roughly normal.2 3
FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LSAT SCORES FOR MATRICULATING
LAW STUDENTS (2008-2009)24
3000
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Approximately four-fifths (eighty-two percent) of the test takers re-
ceived scores between 140 and 165. Roughly nine percent received
scores below 140, and nine percent received scores above 165.
The second premise is that expenditures on legal representation are
the central mechanism by which this heterogeneity in quality emerges.
The intuition here is that the party who incurs more legal expendi-
23. For example, the density of admissions index scores for law school applicants take on a
normal distribution. See LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAC NA-
TIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 9 n.20 (1998), available at http://lsacnet.lsac.org/
research/rr/LSAC-National-Longituinal-Bar-Passage-Study.pdf.
24. E-mail from Philip Handwerk, Institutional Researcher, Law School Admission Council,
to Albert Yoon, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law (July 28, 2009,
16:22:32 AST) (on file with author).
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tures gets better legal representation, 25 either in terms of quantity
(more units of representation), quality (higher level of representa-
tion), or perhaps both.
While these assumptions may comport with our own intuitions, test-
ing these assumptions poses a challenge for two reasons. First, the
pairing of clients and attorneys makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish between attorney ability and case selection. Second, law-
yers often work in groups, making it difficult to identify individual
contributions. Nonetheless, two recent studies, each exploiting a ran-
dom experimental design, provide empirical support for the two
premises.
In 2007, David Abrams and I conducted a study of the Public De-
fender's Office in Las Vegas that provides evidence of heterogeneity
in lawyer quality.26 Fortunately for our study, the Las Vegas office
randomly assigns cases to attorneys within the office, 27 and the attor-
neys individually represent clients from beginning to end.28 This
unique process of assignment creates a natural experiment that avoids
issues of case selection, thereby allowing us to attribute differences in
case outcomes to individual lawyers in the office. 29
We found considerable variation in case outcomes between the
highest and lowest performing lawyers. 30 For example, we found that
clients assigned to lawyers in the ninetieth percentile of ability had an
incarceration rate fourteen percentage points lower than clients as-
signed to lawyers in the tenth percentile; similarly, on average, clients
assigned to lawyers in the ninetieth percentile served 1.2 months
25. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 764 (2001) (writ-
ing that "the side with more money can buy a better lawyer").
26. See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145 (2007).
27. In the office, public defenders are divided into teams to represent indigent clients charged
with felony offenses. Id. at 1164. Each team consists of a team chief and approximately six
attorneys. Id. The team chief assigns attorneys within her team to preliminary hearing dates set
months in advance. Id. After the assignment and before the hearing date, the court fills its
calendar based solely on the cases that come before it. Id. The random assignment excludes
misdemeanors, child sex crimes, and capital cases, all of which are assigned to separate teams.
See id. at 1161.
28. See id. at 1164 (describing vertical representation of clients).
29. Examining cases over a three-year period, we observed differences in outcomes among
lawyers in the office. Id. at 1162. Looking at whether their clients were incarcerated and, if so,
for how long, we found that experienced lawyers achieved more favorable outcomes for their
clients than their less experienced colleagues. Id. at 1168. With respect to other individual attor-
ney characteristics, we found no statistical difference on outcomes based on gender or educa-
tional background, although we did find that Latino lawyers outperformed lawyers of other
ethnic backgrounds. See id. at 1176.
30. See id. at 1150.
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shorter sentences than those clients who were assigned to lawyers in
the tenth percentile.31
The second study provides evidence of the link between parties' re-
sources and legal outcomes. In 2001, Carroll Seron and her colleagues
conducted a randomized experimental study of low-income tenants in
New York City's Housing Court.32 Among this population of tenants,
most were unable to afford a lawyer in the event of a housing dispute,
and therefore, they had to represent themselves in court.33 Because
this study was interested in the returns associated with having legal
representation, the randomization mechanism was whether the client
received a lawyer who was provided free-of-charge and paid for by the
state.34 The authors found that tenants who were represented by a
lawyer fared significantly better than those without a lawyer. 35 For
example, compared with tenants without lawyers, tenants with legal
representation were four times less likely to receive evictions, war-
rants, or default judgments, and twice as likely to be granted abate-
ments or repairs. 36
While limited to specific, discrete areas of the law, these studies
provide support for the assumptions central to my argument. The
Abrams-Yoon study provides evidence that, even within a single firm,
lawyer quality is heterogeneous, and however fair (or random) the
process, the allocation of lawyers to clients can have significant conse-
quences. The Seron study provides evidence of the positive returns to
expenditures for legal representation, at least when having and not
having legal representation is concerned. An indigent or poor client's
limited access to legal representation is not confined to criminal and
housing law. When legal problems arise, they are consistently less
likely to contact or receive representation from a lawyer. 37
31. The average incarceration rate was thirty-nine percent, and the average sentence length
was seven months. See id. at 1162 tbl.2.
32. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
419 (2001).
33. Id. at 421.
34. Id. at 423-24.
35. Id. at 426-29.
36. See id. at 428 (describing differences in legal outcomes between represented and unrepre-
sented indigent parties).
37. See AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 28 (1994).
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III. WEALTH AMONG LEGAL PARTIES
The relationship between parties' wealth and litigation outcomes
can be broken down into two parts: (1) the distribution of wealth
across parties, and (2) the distribution of wealth between parties.
A. Distribution of Wealth Across Parties
Analyzing the relationship between a party's wealth and the litiga-
tion outcome first requires an understanding of the distribution of
wealth across the general parties, or the population of prospective
parties more generally. If this distribution were fairly uniform across
the population, then concerns about disparities in legal expenditures
would largely dissipate. However, as one might suspect, as illustrated
by Figure 2, the distribution of wealth, at least in the United States, is
non-uniform.
FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, U.S. HOUSEHOLDS, 200738
Bottom 49th
2%
38. See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt
and the Middle-Class Squeeze 11 (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper Collection, 2007), available at
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The figure illustrates how the nation's wealth is heavily concen-
trated among the wealthiest households. The wealthiest one percent
of households own one-third of the wealth, and the wealthiest five
percent of the nation's households collectively own sixty percent of
the nation's wealth. Collectively, the top half of the population owns
ninety-seven percent of the overall wealth. Compared to other devel-
oped countries, the United States ranks near the top in income
inequality. 39
While the adverse effect of wealth inequality on housing,40 health-
care,41 and education42 is well documented, its effect on litigation is
more subtle, and for this reason, relatively unexplored. Recent arti-
cles have described the growing cost of litigation, which forces many
parties to represent themselves in legal proceedings that often involve
complex legal matters.43 This phenomenon has affected the middle-
class as well as the poor.44
B. Distribution of Wealth Between Parties
This brings us to the second step in analyzing the relationship be-
tween a party's wealth and the litigation outcome: the allocation of
wealth between opposing parties in litigation. Galanter famously dis-
tinguishes between the haves and the have-nots, 45 a dichotomy that
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp-502.pdf (reporting net worth of households); Federal Reserve
Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Oss/oss2/2007/scf2007
home.html (providing links for most recent study conducted in 2007).
39. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that the
United States ranked fourth out of thirty countries in income inequality, based on the Gini
coefficient, ranking ahead of only three countries: Portugal, Turkey, and Mexico. See ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GROWING UNEQUAL? INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN
OECD COUNTRIES 25 (2008), available at http://www.sourceoecd.org/upload/8108051etemp.pdf.
40. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN
AMERICA 169-70 (2001); Michael Powell & Christine Haughney, New York's Homeless Get
Prison for Shelter: City Wrestles with Options As Record Number in Need, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,
2002, at A3.
41. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to Addressing Ine-
qualities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color, and Immigrant Communities, 8 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 35 (2004) (describing the factors that lead to lower qualities of care for
poorer communities); Norman L. Cantor, The Law and Poor People's Access to Health Care, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 901 (1970) (same).
42. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Higher Education May Soon Be Unaffordable for Most Americans,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at A19 (describing how an increasing number of high
school graduates cannot afford college, given rising college tuition and reduced grants and
loans).
43. See Jonathan D. Glater, Amateur Hour in Court: In a Downturn, More Act As Their Own
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at Al.
44. See Margery A. Gibbs, Courts See More People'Being Own Lawyers, DENVER POST, Nov.
25, 2008, at 2A.
45. See Galanter, supra note 2.
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rings true. It is difficult to create finer gradations along the contin-
uum, given the limited information on the relative wealth of liti-
gants.46 Parties are not required to publicly disclose their wealth in
any legal proceeding, nor are lawyers required to disclose how much
they charge their clients. The available data suggest, however, that
wealth disparities exist between litigants, at least in certain areas of
the law.
Criminal cases provide one such example. Each criminal case in-
volves the government against the defendant. While some defendants
are able to retain their own counsel, the vast majority qualify for
court-appointed counsel.47 Existing studies show that approximately
seventy percent of federal defendants 48 and eighty percent of state
defendants 49 are indigent. Given these figures, it is well documented
that prosecutors generally have more resources than most criminal de-
fense counsel.50
Similarly, in certain areas of civil litigation, such as civil rights, tax,
and immigration, the government is often one of the parties in-
volved. 51 While there may be instances where the government finds
itself at a relative disadvantage in resources-such as when it brings a
securities claim against a large private firm-it is more common that
any resource disparity cuts in the other direction.
46. While parties have to satisfy pleading requirements, they are not required to report their
overall wealth in any public court records.
47. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 815 (2006) (noting that by 1992, eighty percent of all criminal defendants qualified for repre-
sentation by a public defender).
48. See Radha Iyengar, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, An Analysis of the Performance of
Federal Indigent Defense Counsel 34 tbl.1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13187; see also Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: In-
fluencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 879 (1995) (citing federal criminal statistics); Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal
Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 583 (1995) (citing state criminal statistics).
49. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
50. See, e.g., ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND
DONE WELL 100 (1992) (discussing how prosecutors have more resources than most public de-
fenders); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 139 (1966)
(describing how a prosecutor is seven times more likely than a defense attorney to offer the only
expert witness).
51. For example, in 2007, the U.S. government was a plaintiff in four percent, and a defendant
in fourteen percent, of federal civil cases. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 AN-
NUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 23 (2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/contents.htm.
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IV. DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
In the absence of a true randomized experiment, it is impossible to
directly measure differences in the quality of legal representation.
Observed differences can be due to selection effects, and if so, the
differences in lawyer performance may reflect differences in case as-
signment rather than lawyer quality. In an alternative approach to
assessing differences in the quality of legal representation, Judge
Richard Posner and I sent out surveys to a random sample of 455 Arti-
cle III judges asking their impressions of the quality of the legal pro-
fession in both civil and criminal matters, to which 237 judges (fifty-
two percent) responded.
When asked to rate the quality of legal representation in federal
criminal cases on a scale from one (lowest quality) to five (highest
quality), judges responded as follows:
TABLE 1
ARTICLE III JUDGES' RATING OF CRIMINAL LAWYERS
Type of Criminal Lawyer Rating Sd
Prosecutor 4.16 (0.62)
Public Defender 4.29 (0.61)
Court-Appointed Counsel 3.59 (0.63)
Private Counsel (paid by client) 3.64 (0.67)
The F statistic across the four types of criminal lawyers is statistically
significant at p < 0.001, strongly indicating the judges' ratings are not
all equal across the groups.52 Judges gave their highest ratings to pub-
lic defenders, followed closely by prosecutors. The difference in rat-
ings between these lawyer types was small and statistically non-
significant (p < 0.001). 53 By contrast, judges gave statistically signifi-
cant lower ratings to court-appointed (i.e., non-public defender) coun-
sel and private counsel.5 4 These figures suggest that the judges'
perceived disparities in legal representation are relatively small (and
statistically non-significant) between prosecutors and public defend-
52. The one-way analysis of variance for repeated measures produced a F-statistic of 72.79 (p
< 0.001)
53. To test for multiple (pairwise) comparisons of significance in Table 1 and Table 2, I used
the Bonferroni, Scheff, and Sidak normalizations. These adjustments control for non-indepen-
dence across groups, thereby reducing the likelihood of erroneously finding statistical signifi-
cance in pairwise comparisons of means. These normalizations produced similar results.
54. The difference in ratings between court-appointed counsel and private counsel was small
and statistically non-significant.
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ers, but relatively large in cases involving prosecutors and other types
of criminal defense lawyers.
In civil cases, we asked judges to rate the quality of lawyers by area
of law, and the responses are collected in Table 2. As with Table 1, the
judges' ratings were not equal across groups (p < 0.001). Judges gave
the highest ratings to commercial litigation and intellectual property
lawyers, and the lowest to family and immigration lawyers. The differ-
ence in ratings between commercial litigation and intellectual prop-
erty were small and statistically non-significant. By contrast, the
differences between these two groups and the other practice areas are
large and statistically significant (p < 0.001). 55 While they do not pro-
vide definitive proof, the ratings in Table 2 suggest that lawyers may
be sorting across practice areas. A causal explanation is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is noteworthy that commercial and intel-
lectual property lawyers on average earn the highest salaries, while
family and immigration lawyers typically earn much less.56
TABLE 2
ARTICLE III JUDGES' RATING OF CIVIL LAWYERS BY
PRACTICE AREA
Area of Civil Litigation Rating (sd)
Commercial Litigation 4.25 (0.60)
Civil Rights 3.36 (0.76)
Family 3.15 (0.69)
Immigration 3.00 (0.92)
Intellectual Property 4.40 (0.64)
Personal Injury/Malpractice 3.67 (0.68)
Tax/Trusts & Estates 3.88 (0.66)
To better understand the allocation of legal ability within each area
of law, we asked judges to identify the area of law in which they per-
ceived the greatest disparity in the quality of legal representation.
In separate questions, judges were then asked to identify the area of
civil litigation in which they most frequently observed a significant dif-
ference in the quality of opposing lawyers. The following table sum-
marizes the judges' responses:
55. Although not listed here, other pairwise comparisons of civil litigation practice areas were
statistically significant.
56. See NALP, STARTING SALARIES: WHAT NEW LAW GRADUATES EARN 6 (2008).
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TABLE 3A
ARTICLE III JUDGES' OBSERVED SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY
IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Area of Civil Litigation Most Frequent
Commercial Litigation 4%
Civil Rights 61%
Family 2%
Immigration 17%
Intellectual Property 1%
Personal Injury/Malpractice 14%
Tax/Trusts & Estates 1%
Clear patterns emerge from their responses. Judges overwhelmingly
identified civil rights cases as the cases exhibiting the most frequent
significant disparity between opposing counsel. Immigration and per-
sonal injury comprised the next two largest areas of law, but they were
small by comparison. Collectively, ninety-two percent of judges
pointed to one of these three areas of law.57 Commercial law and
intellectual property, two areas primarily in the domain of large pri-
vate practice firms, were identified by only five percent of the
judges.58
It is worth mentioning that if we rank the areas of law in ascending
order of frequency of observed significant disparity in the quality of
legal representation, one can draw a line that places some areas of law
on one side-intellectual property; tax, trust and estates; family law;
and commercial litigation-and other areas of law on the other side-
personal injury and malpractice; immigration; and civil rights.
57. Judges were also asked to identify the area of civil practice with the least amount of dispar-
ity in legal representation. Forty-two percent of judges identified commercial law, and forty-five
percent identified intellectual property. By contrast, eleven percent of judges pointed to civil
rights (two percent), immigration (four percent), and personal injury (five percent).
58. We also asked judges to identify areas of law in which they least often observed a signifi-
cant disparity in legal representation. Forty-two percent of respondents identified commercial
litigation, while forty-five percent identified intellectual property. By contrast, less than two
percent identified civil rights.
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TABLE 3B
ARTICLE III JUDGES' OBSERVED SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY
IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 5 9
Area of Civil Litigation Most Frequent
Intellectual Property 1%
Tax/Trusts & Estates 1%
Family 2%
Commercial Litigation 4%
Personal Injury/Malpractice 14%
Immigration 17%
Civil Rights 61%
With the exception of family law, the areas of civil litigation above the
line typically involve sophisticated litigants on both sides, many of
whom are familiar with litigation.60 Conversely, the areas of civil liti-
gation below the line typically involve less sophisticated litigants who
are unfamiliar with litigation, such as plaintiffs in civil rights cases and
personal injury and malpractice cases, as well as defendants in immi-
gration case. This divide is consistent with Galanter's argument about
the haves and have-nots.61
This divide is also consistent with my argument regarding litigant
wealth. In each of the areas of civil litigation above the line, it is com-
mon that opposing litigants both have considerable wealth, particu-
larly when it involves firms.62 Conversely, for areas of law below the
line, an individual is usually matched against a firm, an insurer, or the
government. While the individual may have comparable wealth, it is
more likely the anomaly than the norm.
Judges were then asked a follow-up question: For the area of civil
litigation they identified as having the most frequent disparity in the
quality of legal representation, which lawyer do they perceive as typi-
cally being of higher quality?
59. I am indebted to Marc Galanter for suggesting the similarities of the results in Table 3b
with his prior research.
60. The courts often consider the sophistication of the parties in a dispute. See, e.g., Cum-
mings Props., LLC v. Nat'l Commc'ns Corp., 869 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Mass. 2007) (considering the
fact that the parties were sophisticated commercial entities as a relevant factor in awarding liqui-
dated damages).
61. Galanter, supra note 2, at 95.
62. Galanter describes how some litigation involves repeat players-usually government and
business-who interact with each other often. Id. at 107 fig.l, 110-11. While Galanter does not
make this point explicitly, repeat players are more likely to have the resources to litigate.
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TABLE 4
ARTICLE III JUDGES' PERCEPTION OF HIGHER-QUALITY LAWYER
(GIVEN OBSERVED SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY)
Area of Civil Litigation Plainti Defendant EaUAa
Civil Rights 2% 88% 9%
Immigration 14% 76% 11%
Personal Injury/Malpractice 0% 78% 22%
Note: Numbers may not add to 100% due to rounding.
In each of these areas of law, judges identified large differences in
the quality of legal representation. In civil rights and immigration liti-
gation, the defense (i.e., the government) was identified as providing
higher quality legal representation. In the area of personal injury and
malpractice, judges identified the defense-typically a corporation or
large insurer-as providing higher quality legal representation; not a
single judge selected the plaintiff's lawyer.
Finally, we asked judges how a significant disparity in the quality
between opposing counsel at trial affected the jury. Table 5 reports
the responses of judges.63 While fifty percent of judges thought that
significant disparities in the quality of legal representation did not af-
fect the jury, nearly the same percentage (forty-nine percent) thought
that it favored the stronger attorney. Only one percent of judges per-
ceived that a litigant benefitted from having the weaker lawyer.
TABLE 5
ARTICLE III JUDGES' PERCEIVED JURY RESPONSE TO
SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY IN QUALITY OF
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Response Percentage
Typically Favors Litigant with Weaker Lawyer 1%
Typically Favors Litigant with Stronger Lawyer 49%
Typically Favors Neither Litigant 50%
The judicial survey responses should be interpreted with the usual
caveats of caution regarding surveys. They cannot provide a precise
measure of the degree of disparity in legal representation, or even de-
finitively establish that disparities exist. Moreover, judges' responses,
however informed, reflect their impressions from the bench and may
be biased. Nonetheless, their responses are consistent with both the
63. Approximately ten percent of judges responded that they could not answer the question
because they had not presided over a jury trial.
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model and the other empirical evidence that suggest that disparities in
the quality of legal representation exist and may influence case out-
comes.64 The magnitude of some of their figures suggests that these
disparities may be significant.
V. LITIGATION IN THE SHADOW OF PARTIES' RESOURCES
I briefly return to Shavell's Suit, Settlement, and Trial article. In his
article, Shavell shows how the plaintiff (P) will bring suit when her
expected gross return (xp) exceeds her expected litigation costs (cp). 65
Once suit has been brought, parties will proceed to trial if P's net re-
turn (XP - cp) is greater than D's net return (xd + Cd), and settle other-
wise. 66 Figure 3 slightly modifies Shavell's original figure. 67 The
model, like many models of litigation, is an optimization model, where
parties are attempting to achieve the best possible outcome, given the
facts, the law, and the costs of litigation. One of the important contri-
butions from this model is to show how parties make decisions based
on their expectation of future outcomes. This strategic behavior dis-
courages most prospective plaintiffs from bringing suit with a negative
expected suit value. Similarly, it encourages parties who have brought
suit to settle when doing so allows both parties to avoid the transac-
tion costs of a trial. This model provides a theoretical basis for why
the vast majority of cases settle.68
Absent from these models are constraints on parties' resources.
Litigation costs are relevant to the outcome, but they primarily re-
present a hurdle to bringing suit or proceeding to trial. In most mod-
els, litigation costs do not determine the substantive outcome of the
case. More significantly, for this reason, parties' relative and absolute
resources are not germane; the models assume that the parties could,
if they chose, incur their relative litigation costs. Even models that
recognize litigation costs, which ultimately depend on the underlying
facts, law, and expenditures of the opposing party,69 fail to consider
resource constraints of the parties.
64. See Abrams &Yoon, supra note 26.
65. See Shavell, supra note 7, at 58.
66. Id. at 64.
67. Id. at 57 fig.1
68. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (citing statistics showing that approxi-
mately nine out of ten cases settle without a trial, and approximately two-thirds settle without
any "definitive judicial ruling").
69. See Katz, supra note 1, at 127.
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FIGURE 3
SEQUENCE OF LITIGATION
P & D go to trial
if ("1X5 %)(d+cd)
P brings suit "'
P does not bring
suit if (xp<c,)
For example,70 suppose a plaintiff (P) and defendant (D) both be-
lieve that if P were to bring suit and prevail at trial, she would recover
$10,000. Both parties are risk-neutral (i.e., they care only about the
expected outcome and are unaffected by the range of possible out-
comes), but they differ in their beliefs on the likelihood of this judg-
ment. P believes that her chances of prevailing are eighty percent. If
her litigation costs are $1,000, her net expected recovery (xp - co) is
$7,000 ($10,000 x 0.80 - $1,000). Under these expectations, P brings
suit. D believes that if he is taken to trial, he will incur $1,000 in litiga-
tion costs but have a fifty percent chance of a favorable verdict (zero
damages award). D's net expected payout (xd + cd) is $6,000 ($10,000
x 0.50 + $1,000). In this scenario, the parties will proceed to trial be-
cause both sides believe that going to trial would yield a more
favorable outcome than settling the case on terms that the other side
will accept, given their respective beliefs.
Suppose, however, that the parties must choose between two levels
of litigation expenditures: high and low. The litigation expenditures in
the previous paragraph represent the high: Cp, high = CD, high = $1,000.
Alternatively, each side could spend a lower amount. If P spends low
70. This example is a modification of the original Shavell example. See Shavell, supra note 7,
at 58-59.
Vol. 59:649
2010] THE IMPORTANCE OF LITIGANT WEALTH 667
(Cp, Iow = $500) her chances of prevailing are thirty percent; if D spends
low (CD, o, = $500) her chances of a defense verdict are thirty percent.
The intuition is that each party can save on litigation expenses by
spending less, but doing so will decrease the likelihood of a favorable
outcome at trial. With low litigation expenses, P's net expected return
is only $2,500; D's net expected payout increases to $7,500. Plugging
the values from above yields the following:
FIGURE 4
LEVEL OF LITIGATION EXPENDITURES ON SUIT RESOLUTION
D
high low
high
P
low
If at least one of the parties chooses low rather than high litigation
expenditures, the expected outcomes at trial will change such that the
parties will have a mutual incentive to settle rather than proceed to
trial. In addition, introducing the choice of low litigation expenditures
affects the range of settlement outcomes. If P spends low and D
spends high, the settlement range is between $2,500 and $6,000; if D
spends low while P spends high, the settlement range is between
$7,000 and $7,500; finally, if both parties spend low, the settlement
range is its largest, between $2,500 and $7,500.
The point of this simple example is to show that the level of expend-
itures may affect the means by which parties resolve disputes and the
substantive terms of their resolution. Parties' resource constraints are
an important additional parameter to these litigation models. Utility-
maximizing parties will continue to bring suit when their expected re-
turn is positive; and upon the plaintiff bringing suit, the parties will
forego trial for settlement when it mutually benefits them. As before,
outcomes are a function of the parties' expectations and litigation
costs. However, these terms are interrelated: parties' expectations are
a function of their litigation costs. Finally, these costs themselves are
a function of the parties' resources. Thus, outcomes are partially a
function of the parties' resources.
(xp - cp) > (xd -cd) (Xp -Cp) < (xd -cd)
$7,000 > $6,000 $7,000 < $7,500
Trial Settlement
(xp - c) < (xd - Cd) (xp - cP) < (xd -cd)
$2,500 < $6,000 $2,500 < $7,500
Settlement Settlement
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Abstracting away from the example above, we can consider how
parties' resources affect the various stages of litigation. When decid-
ing whether to file a suit, a plaintiff is deciding whether to "invest" in
litigation based on whether the expected net returns are positive. Ex-
isting models inform us that when net returns are negative (i.e., xp - Cp
< 0), then the plaintiff will not bring suit. Negative returns can reflect
three different states of the plaintiff's case: (1) it is nonmeritorious or
weak; (2) it is meritorious, but it requires more expenditures in legal
representation than the case is worth; or (3) it is meritorious, but the
plaintiff lacks the resources to bring suit. While it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the distribution of prospective plaintiffs
across these three categories, cost constraints prevent some plaintiffs
from bringing meritorious suits (i.e., plaintiffs in State Two or Three).
Conversely, plaintiffs without constraints on resources may bring non-
meritorious or weak suits (i.e., plaintiffs in State One).
Of course, the example above does not capture the full effect of
choices on litigation expenditures for settlement and trial. It assumes
that a party's expected outcome depends only on her own expenditure
level; in actual litigation, outcomes are likely jointly determined by
both parties' choice of litigation expenditures. The degree to which
parties can exploit their resources depends on the resources of their
opponents. For example, all things equal, a party who can incur high
litigation expenditures would fare better when her opponent can incur
only low expenditures than when her opponent can also incur high
expenditures. 71
In general, resource constraints may promote settlement to the ex-
tent to which they enable the plaintiff's expected net return (xp - c%) to
fall below the defendant's expected net return (xd + Cd). In so doing,
these constraints may influence not simply the decision to settle or
proceed to trial, but also the substantive terms within that decision.
To the extent that higher litigation expenditures produce a higher net
return-a reasonable assumption, given that parties would be acting
irrationally to incur these expenditures otherwise-relative resource
advantages skew the expected settlement or trial outcome in favor of
the wealthier party. The normative implications are outside the scope
of this Article; my point here is simply to show how resource dispari-
ties may affect outcomes in ways that are unobservable to those who
are not personally involved in the litigation. Terms of settlements are
typically non-public; trial outcomes, while public, do not reveal the
71. In addition, the model assumes binary expenditure levels, whereas actual litigation ex-
penditures are a continuous variable.
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parties' relative resources or the degree to which they produced the
observed outcome.
While proponents of tort reform have argued that the current legal
system makes wealthy individuals vulnerable to frivolous lawsuits,72
this Article makes the opposite argument: the current system actually
disfavors those with resource constraints. In litigation, prospective
plaintiffs with resource constraints may elect not to bring suit. Plain-
tiffs who do bring suit may find that that wealthier defendants can
exploit their resource advantage through various mechanisms-such
as prolonged discovery-to prevail or resolve the dispute on favorable
terms. Wealthier plaintiffs can use their resource advantage to
achieve similarly favorable terms.
VI. EXISTING MECHANISMS TO MITIGATE RESOURCE
DISPARITY AND THEIR LIMITS
Our legal system offers various mechanisms that directly or indi-
rectly mitigate the consequences of parties' resource constraints.
While certainly helpful to address substantive and procedural issues
that arise in litigation, these mechanisms are limited in their ability to
address the full consequence of resource constraints.
A. Appeals
While the Supreme Court has declined to recognize a constitutional
right to appeal in either civil73 or criminal cases, 74 most states provide
this right through statute.75 The appeals process provides an opportu-
nity for courts to formally reexamine earlier decisions.
This process, however, provides only a limited remedy. First, it is
limited only to court decisions, not settlements. Parties dissatisfied by
settlement, barring fraud, have no remedy. Second, in most jurisdic-
tions, appellate courts, although they review a lower court's determi-
nation of law de novo, view a lower court's findings of fact with
72. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement, 35 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 437, 510 (2006) ("[T]he tort reform movement constantly asserts that frivolous
claims are an important widespread problem in that there are 'too many' frivolous lawsuits.").
73. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("[A] State is not required by the Federal
Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.").
74. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("There is, of course, no constitutional right
to an appeal .... ).
75. See Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 Am. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 44 n.185 (1995) (noting that every state affords criminal defendants the right to
appeal their conviction); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil
Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 576 (noting that "virtually all court systems
provide at least one opportunity for appeal as of right").
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deference.76 Given that most cases are fact-intensive, this standard of
review makes it more likely that appellate courts will uphold lower
courts' decisions. In addition, it is highly likely that resource dispari-
ties between parties at the trial stage will continue to be present dur-
ing the appeal.
B. Contingency Fees
Contingency fee arrangements-whether involving individual plain-
tiffs or class actions 77-empower plaintiffs who, given their resource
constraints, may otherwise be precluded from litigating their claim.
Contingency fees provide a means by which the plaintiffs' lawyers, not
the plaintiffs, finance the litigation 78 because the lawyer is compen-
sated only if the plaintiff prevails. Thus, the plaintiff and her lawyer
share similar incentives because the latter recovers only when her cli-
ent or clients do.
Contingency fees, however, provide only limited relief. The contin-
gency fee market, while well-developed, is thin relative to the de-
mands for legal services. Under this fee arrangement, lawyers may
restrict themselves to cases where they are likely to win or where the
expected recovery is high, leaving a void for meritorious claims that
are more difficult to argue or low expected recovery. In addition, be-
cause the incentives of the plaintiff and her lawyer are not perfectly
aligned, moral hazard problems exist.79
C. Public Financing of Legal Services
The U.S. Supreme Court has established limited constitutional safe-
guards for legal representation. Its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright
requires that all levels of government provide legal representation to
76. See Jonathan R. Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Struc-
ture and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1804 (2008).
77. Class actions also provide a solution to the collective action problem where "small recov-
eries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves the problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Wind-
sor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.
1997)).
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 676 (1986) (describing how the traditional compensation scheme for plaintiffs' law-
yers in class actions is contingency fees).
79. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel
by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 679 (2002) (describing the moral hazard problem of legal
representation in the corporate context).
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all indigent criminal defendants. 80 Governments fulfill their constitu-
tional obligation either by paying defense counsel from the private bar
or creating an office of the public defender. In civil matters, the Con-
stitution does not expressly guarantee a right to legal representation,
and the Court has declined to interpret such a right through the Four-
teenth Amendment. 81 However, in 1974, Congress did create the Le-
gal Services Corporation, which provides legal services to low-income
Americans in civil matters.82 Moreover, many states have, either
through the courts or statutes, recognized a right to counsel in various
civil matters, including parental rights83 and immigration. 84
Public financing of legal services, while helpful, is ultimately lim-
ited. The constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in criminal
cases is limited to indigent defendants.85 Legal aid for indigent civil
clients provides even less coverage; clients who qualify for these ser-
vices are not entitled to these services. Instead, they may simply enter
into a de facto lottery to receive them. The number of clients requir-
ing these services far exceeds the number of lawyers available. 86
VII. GOING FORWARD
The degree to which this Article raises social concerns ultimately
depends on one's view of the allocations of both wealth and legal dis-
putes across society. As illustrated by Figure 2, some individuals have
more wealth than others.87 Unless one believes that a party's wealth
is positively correlated with the merits of her claim or defense, a legal
80. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (articulating the requirements for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 375 (1963) (ex-
tending the right to government-provided counsel to indigent criminal defendants in state court).
81. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (declining to hold that the
absence of legal representation in civil matters raises due process considerations).
82. See Legal Services Corporation, What Is LSC?, http://www.lsc.gov/aboutlsc.php (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2009).
83. For example, Alabama, Louisiana, and New York recognize a right to counsel in termina-
tion of parental rights cases, whether brought by the state or another private individual. See
Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind New
Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
84. For example, Florida statutes require the state government to provide an attorney during
actions regarding the immigration status of children who are eligible for special immigrant juve-
nile status. See id. at 2.
85. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44 (1963) (extending the right to court-appointed counsel to
indigent criminal defendants in state court).
86. See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright,
15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 527, 527 (2006) ("While there is one lawyer for every 525
people in the general population, there is only one lawyer for every 6,861 low-income people.").
87. See supra note 38 & fig.2.
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system in which legal outcomes are influenced by the wealth of the
parties raises efficiency as well as normative concerns.
The policy challenges of an unequal distribution of wealth on the
legal system mirrors those for other quasi-public goods. While we
may chafe at the notion that the quality of public goods and services
that we receive depends on our wealth, the reality is that it most cer-
tainly does. Wealthier individuals typically receive better health-
care,88 and they attend better schools.89 Governmental efforts to
equalize expenditures have met strong resistance. 90 As a practical
matter, in a world of limited public funds, public funding for legal ex-
penditures is a difficult sell. On the hierarchy of needs, it is unlikely
that the public would give legal services the same priority as food,
shelter, education, and healthcare.
A limited, but perhaps more compelling, argument for a greater
provision for public legal services is based on economic efficiency.
The idea is that by "investing" in public legal services, government can
reduce other costs for which they will ultimately be responsible for
paying. For example, since the early 1990s, New York City has pro-
vided legal counsel for low-income residents. 91 A 1996 study found
that while the cost of providing counsel was approximately $12 million
dollars, the City allowed thousands of low-income families to remain
in their homes, which in turn saved the City over $27 million in ex-
penses for homeless shelters. 92
88. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1716 (2005) (describing how the wealthy receive better healthcare than the
middle class, which receives better care than the poor).
89. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 39 (2004) ("Wealthy communities generally spend much more per
capita on their schools, but can still tax their residents at much lower rates than poorer
communities .... ).
90. For example, in 1997 the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled that the state system of financ-
ing public education-local expenditures determined in large part by local taxes-violated the
state constitution. See Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (1997). In the aftermath of this
decision, the Vermont legislature enacted legislation that substantially equalized funding across
the state by creating a statewide property tax to replace local property taxes and by equalizing
spending across districts. See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education As Private
Luxury, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 792-97 (2004) (providing a detailed description of school funding
in Vermont). Opposition to this act led to the passage of another act in 2003 that allowed
wealthier districts to raise additional revenue that they could then retain for their own schools.
See id.
91. Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must
Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 699, 704-10 (2006) (surveying
the history of city, state, and federal funding for legal services to low-income residents in New
York City).
92. Id. at 710-11 (describing the New York City's cost savings associated with providing legal
representation to low-income housing litigants).
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Finally, we know relatively little about the marginal returns on legal
representation expenditures. As with any empirical examination of
lawyers, issues of selection bias and unobservable variables arise. A
randomized experiment offers the most compelling way to sidestep
some of these challenges. I am in the early stages of a legal aid study
in which cases are randomly assigned between different types of pub-
lic interest lawyers. In this study we can observe both the lawyers'
compensation and their level of effort on outcomes. While there is
little doubt that the quality of legal representation matters, this study
may allow us to better understand the mechanisms that make it true.
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